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Abbey and Vitalis: Oilcraft: The Myths of Scarcity and Security that Haunt U.S. Ener

United States” (p. 23). Herein lies an
admonition for the policy makers and
national-security professionals who
should read The American Way of
Empire: too often America sets forth
to change the world, without realizing
that just as often the world changes it.
JEFFREY P. ROGG

Oilcraft: The Myths of Scarcity and Security That
Haunt U.S. Energy Policy, by Robert Vitalis. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2020. 224 pages.
$24.

Energy analysts often gripe that everyone who drives a car or owns a lightbulb
thinks this provides sufficient training
to claim expertise in energy markets. In
his new book, contrarian University of
Pennsylvania political scientist Robert
Vitalis takes to task mainstream experts
who equate oil with power. At times
breezily polemical, this concise but
richly researched foray is a valuable
contribution to the prolific “geopolitics
of energy” literature in fashion today.
The incisive commentary begins with
the title: the word oilcraft is a play on
witchcraft, not statecraft or tradecraft; it
is explicitly pejorative, not complimentary. Laying his cynical cards on the table
from the outset, Vitalis is unrelenting
in his critique of the “modern-day form
of magical realism” (p. 6) that presumes
that oil is the “lifeblood or weapon or
prize” (p. 23), constituting an axiomatic
truth that consequently requires a special relationship with Persian Gulf nations, military commitments around the
world, and strategic deal making with
unsavory regimes. He derides as a pernicious myth the “need once to control
and now secure access, stabilize prices,
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or prevent hostile powers from holding
the world economy hostage” (p. 122).
Vitalis names names and spares none,
reserving his most incendiary ammunition not for policy makers, as one might
expect, but for his fellow academics.
The analytical core of the book comprises detailed surveys of energy-security
discussions in the 1920s and 1970s. In
the earlier period, policy makers panicked about Britain’s expansive control
of global oil supplies, which prompted
the rise, within the burgeoning field of
international relations, of the so-called
Columbia School, which dismissed
great-power competition as an unnecessary and counterproductive geopolitical
framework for consideration. The
lessons of these debates, Vitalis argues,
were long forgotten by the time resource
scarcity again seized the nation’s consciousness. This later period, beginning
around 1973, is broadly misunderstood.
For instance, it was a group of Arab
countries that imposed the infamous
oil embargo, not the Organization of
the Petroleum Exporting Countries; the
upward pressure on oil prices—driven
by a complex host of reasons, including turbulent international financial
conditions—predated the Yom Kippur
War, and therefore was not caused by it,
as is sometimes portrayed. One of the
most interesting points Vitalis makes is
that the resulting higher oil prices fueled
greater development of oil resources
in the United States (e.g., in Alaska
and the offshore Gulf of Mexico).
Other episodes make brief cameos,
recast in a petroleum-tinted light: the
so-called Tanker War between Iran and
Iraq, Operations DESERT STORM and
IRAQI FREEDOM, the development of the
Carter Doctrine, the deployment of U.S.
Marines to Lebanon, and the slew of

1

158

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 4, Art. 18

terrorist attacks that came to characterize the American presence in the region.
This historical analysis builds up to the
political climax of the book. Echoing his previous work on American
foreign policy in the Middle East,
Vitalis gleefully dismantles the widely
accepted assertion that the Roosevelt
administration and the Saudi royal
family agreed to a nebulous “oil for
security” deal during World War II.
According to folklore—which Vitalis
skewers—the United States, ever since
those bygone days, has protected the
kingdom (including with deadly force)
in an explicit exchange for petroleum
access. Instead, Vitalis argues that
oil markets would function just fine
regardless of who holds the keys to
Abqaiq, Ras Tanura, and the rest of the
Saudi kingdom’s oil bounty. He asserts
that energy-security concerns are
employed misleadingly to justify the
perpetuation of this polarizing alliance,
about the merits of which he is deeply
skeptical. The author writes with
admiration for the similarly skeptical
scholars of the 1920s and 1970s who
challenged the conventional wisdom
about energy security as the basis for
foreign-policy decisions (particularly
in terms of military intervention).
Robert Vitalis makes bold and clear
claims. One wonders whether a mere
134 pages of text (before the acknowledgments and endnotes) are enough
to marshal the necessary evidence
and argumentation. He succeeds in
building his case, but the reader is
left wanting a bit more. The book
also is peppered with an unfortunate
and thoroughly unnecessary number
of typographical errors that detract
from the cutting prose and punchy
critiques of the existing literature.
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Although mentioned only in passing,
the twenty-first-century growth in
domestic U.S. oil production and
America’s rise to prominence as a
significant exporter of petroleum
already are prompting a reevaluation of
long-standing national-security policy.
Whether this reevaluation necessarily
entails a reduction in, realignment of,
or reckoning with respect to the nation’s
presence overseas is a contentious
proposition. Even asking the question is
enough to raise hackles in Washington,
where bureaucratic inertia enables the
circling of wagons with impressive
speed. The case studies that Vitalis
presents remind us that these debates are
not new. Readers may not agree with all
his conclusions—and certainly not with
every sarcastic remark he directs toward
other scholars—but the argument is
challenging, brisk, and unwavering. It
warrants close examination by regional
specialists and global strategists alike,
and, perhaps, a full-fledged rebuttal
from the alleged sorcerers of oilcraft.
TRISTAN ABBEY

A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy, by James R.
Holmes. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
2019. 200 pages. $24.95.

Naval training, by necessity, is anchored
in developing technical and tactical
expertise quickly. All newly minted
officers preparing to serve on, above,
or below the surface of the ocean are
assimilating how-to skills. Demands on
their time do not diminish in their first
operational command, where training
continues and expectations increase.
In this busy and technology-heavy
environment, there often is little time
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